This is a translation of my recent article written in Russian. The translation was generated by Google, proofread by ChatGPT, and edited by yours truly.
Considerable time has elapsed since the start of the New Year, and more definitive data is now emerging regarding the outcomes of the past year, particularly in the realm of international trade. Against the backdrop of Putin’s aggression against Ukraine, I sought to examine the trade dynamics between South Korea and the Russian Federation.
You may be aware that Seoul strongly condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukrainian territory in February 2022. Subsequently, aligning with its allies and partners, South Korea implemented various types of sanctions against Moscow. I aimed to investigate how these actions impacted bilateral trade and whether any effects were discernible.
However, resolving this inquiry proved to be no simple task. The requisite statistics are available on the website of the Korean Foreign Trade Association (KITA). Lists of goods that Korea supplies to Russia and vice versa, along with their respective costs, can be found. Yet, extracting meaningful information requires combing through various tables, akin to picking grains like a chicken. I present some of my findings here. I must caution you that the article includes numerous numerical details and is better suited for those who enjoy analyzing data independently rather than those who prefer pre-digested information.
Exports from South Korea to Russia by Year, Billion $
2011 — 10.3
2012 — 11.1
2013 — 11.1 (record; $11 billion 149 million)
2014 — 10.1
2015 — 4.7
2016 — 4.8
2017 — 6.9
2018 — 7.3
2019 — 7.8
2020 — 6.9
2021 — 10.0
2022 — 6.3 (– 36.6%)
2023 — 6.2 (— 2.6%)
It’s evident that South Korean exports to Russia have been facing tough times, a trend that began as far back as 2015. The significant drop in the value of Korean exports to Russia in 2015 isn’t directly linked to what you might expect – not the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine, or Western sanctions against Moscow. Instead, it stems from a decline in the real incomes of Russians, starting around 2013. The sharp fall in world oil prices in 2014, coupled with the subsequent collapse of the ruble exchange rate, didn’t do much to boost the wealth of Russian citizens either. All these factors contributed to a decreased demand in Russia for Korean goods, especially for cars imported from Korea. In response, Korean automakers drastically cut exports to Russia, focusing instead on selling cars produced in their Russian factories. In 2012 and 2013, Korean exports of “vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof” (commodity code 87) to Russia exceeded $5.3 billion. However, by 2015, it dropped to $1.75 billion, and in 2016, it further decreased to $1.65 billion.
Regarding why Korean exports to the Russian Federation, which had rebounded by 2021, took another nosedive from $10 billion to $6 billion in 2022, the broad strokes of the situation are widely known. We’ll delve into the specifics later on.
By the way, from now on, I will be using Harmonised System (HS) commodity codes.
Imports from Russia to South Korea by Year, Billion $
2011 — 10.9
2012 — 11.4
2013 — 11.5
2014 — 15.7
2015 — 11.3
2016 — 8.6
2017 — 12.0
2018 — 17.5 (record)
2019 — 14.6
2020 — 10.6
2021 — 17.4
2022 — 14.8 (—14.6%)
2023 — 8.9 (—40.0%)
When it comes to imports, we notice two noticeable drops in 2016 and 2020, explained by sharp decreases in prices of crude oil – the mainstay of Russia’s exports to Korea. For instance, in 2014, Korea imported 5.35 million tons of crude oil from Russia, valued at $4.25 billion. In 2016, though the quantity increased to 5.61 million tons, the revenue dropped to $1.95 billion – more than two times less. Similarly, in 2014, 6.36 million tons of petroleum products were imported, totaling 5.24 billion dollars. In 2016, these numbers decreased to 4.67 million tons and 1.89 billion dollars, respectively.
Regarding the recent drop in import figures in 2022–2023, it’s undoubtedly linked to the war and sanctions, leading to a complete halt in the import of crude oil and petroleum products from Russia to Korea.
Trade turnover between South Korea and Russia, billion $, and the place of the Russian Federation in the list of Korea’s trading partners
2011 — $21.2 billion (13th place)
2012 — $22.5 billion (12)
2013 — $22.6 billion (12)
2014 — $25.8 billion (11)
2015 — $16.0 billion (9)
2016 — $13.4 billion (10)
2017 — $19.0 billion (9)
2018 — $24.8 billion (8)
2019 — $22.3 billion (9)
2020 — $17.5 billion (9)
2021 — $27.3 billion (record) (9)
2022 — $21.1 billion (13)
2023 — $15.1 billion (15)
There was a time when Russia stood among the top ten trading partners of South Korea for seven consecutive years, reaching a pinnacle in pre-war 2021 with a record trade turnover of $27.3 billion. Despite the impact of the ongoing war on statistics, economic ties persist, with trade, though significantly reduced to $15 billion, holding considerable value.
Nonetheless, it’s crucial not to overstate the significance of Korean-Russian trade, a reality underscored when comparing it with Korea’s leading trading partners in 2023:
- China — $267.7 billion
- USA — $187.0 billion
- Vietnam — $79.4 billion
- Japan — $76.7 billion
- Australia — $50.6 billion
- Taiwan — $44.6 billion
- Saudi Arabia — $38.1 billion
- Germany — $33.9 billion
- Singapore — $29.9 billion
- Hong Kong — $27.0 billion
South Korea’s total trade turnover with all countries in 2023 reached $1.275 trillion, with Russia’s share accounting for less than 1.2%.
Impact of war and sanctions on exports from South Korea to Russia
Navigating the intricate web of sanctions and their impact on trade, let’s delve into specific examples to discern their efficacy—or lack thereof. A good starting point is the Bureau of Industry and Security at the US Department of the Treasury, which issues recommendations on goods to be vigilantly monitored to prevent entry into the Russian Federation under any circumstances.
The leading item on the list comprises goods that Russia lacks the capability to produce but employs in the manufacturing of advanced weaponry. This specific category is identified as electronic integrated circuits (commodity code 8542). As widely recognized, South Korea is both a producer and exporter of these products. The subsequent data details the export volume of various electronic integrated circuits from Korea to Russia over the past few years.
Product code 8542
Electronic integrated circuits, million dollars.
2018 — 66
2019 — 66
2020 — 55
2021 — 57
2022 — 18 (–68.3%)
2023 — 0.7 (–95.9%)
Here, the sanctions have proven effective, leading to a complete cessation of exports under code 8542. While not evident from the table, a breakdown by month in KITA’s statistics reveals that the last deliveries to Russia under code 8542, amounting to $8,000, were in May 2023, followed by a halt.
Next in importance on the list of the US Bureau of Industry and Security are goods that Russia, in principle, can produce but prefers importing from the United States and their allies, given the limited global manufacturers. One such item is under the code 851762:
Product code 851762
Machines for the reception, conversion and transmission or regeneration of voice, images or other data, including switching and routing apparatus, million dollars.
2018 — 12.6
2019 — 8.3
2020 — 3.9
2021 — 5.8
2022 — 4.1 (–30.2%)
2023 — 4.1 (0.0%)
In this case, while there was a decrease in supplies from Korea to Russia, they continued to some extent. Is this an oversight by authorities, or does Seoul meticulously control and ensure that these supplies serve exclusively peaceful purposes? Perhaps a visit to Seoul by a delegation from the US Treasury, akin to recent events with the Turks, could provide answers to these questions.
Product code 852691
Radio navigational aid apparatus, million dollars.
2018 — 7.0
2019 — 6.3
2020 — 4.4
2021 — 5.3
2022 — 1.5 (–72.5%)
2023 — 10.0 (+641.6%)
Another product on the Bureau of Industry and Security’s list is radio navigation equipment. Here, we observe intriguing fluctuations. Initially, due to sanctions, supplies from Korea to Russia dropped sharply, only to resume with double the energy, surpassing pre-war levels significantly.
Product code 853224
Electrical capacitors; fixed, ceramic dielectric, multilayer, million dollars.
2018 — 2.6
2019 — 2.3
2020 — 3.3
2021 — 2.2
2022 — 0.4 (–82.9%)
2023 — 0.1 (–71.9%)
Similar to the previous instance, ceramic multilayer capacitors fall under the classification of products that Russia theoretically can produce but seemingly prefers importing. With the onset of the war, Korea significantly curtailed capacitor exports to Russia. However, in 2023, for some reason, there was still a supply of over half a ton of these devices, amounting to $107 thousand. The question arises: Why take such a risk for a comparatively small sum when Korea annually exports capacitors worth $1.325 billion, including $611 million to China alone? One can only hope that those involved possess a better understanding of the situation than me.
Interestingly, in 2023, Kyrgyzstan unexpectedly displayed an increased interest in Korean capacitors, purchasing them for $177 thousand—25 times more than the previous year. Perhaps just a coincidence.
Product code 850440
Electrical static converters, million dollars.
2018 — 16.7
2019 — 23.3
2020 — 20.5
2021 — 16.5
2022 — 6.0 (–63.7%)
2023 — 2.3 (–62.1%)
The Bureau of Industry and Safety categorizes static converters in the third group of its list, indicating the widespread availability of manufacturers globally. However, this doesn’t alter the reality that Russia actively seeks to procure static converters from abroad for military purposes. Examining the export trends of converters to Russia, it appears that the Koreans recognize the need to discontinue supplying these goods. Nonetheless, converters have continued to be shipped to the Russian Federation consistently throughout the past year, amounting to $2.3 million—a still significant sum. The term «significant» is crucial here, as if the US Treasury concurs with such an assessment, it may necessitate imposing secondary sanctions against Korean companies.
Product code 848210
Ball bearings, million dollars.
2018 — 18.9
2019 — 8.1
2020 — 1.6
2021 — 2.6
2022 — 4.6 (+72.5%)
2023 — 3.1 (–31.7%)
Ball bearings are a dual-use product applicable in both civilian and military contexts, and therefore should be subject to stricter export controls. In 2022, Korean supplies to Russia witnessed a noticeable surge, particularly in the latter half of the year amid the ongoing war. In 2023, deliveries experienced a sharp slowdown from May to October, leading to an overall decrease. However, trade continued towards the end of the year.
Notably, by the end of 2023 (from September to December), Korean bearings witnessed a significant increase in supplies to Kazakhstan, reaching $510 thousand. In comparison, 2022 recorded a mere $82 thousand. Similarly, Georgia displayed an unprecedented interest in Korean bearings, with exports reaching $117 thousand—almost seven times more than the previous year, with over 100 thousand occurring in November and December, possibly linked to the onset of winter and cold weather.
Let’s now selectively examine the most prominent articles in Korean exports to Russia, irrespective of export control.
Product code 87
Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof, billion dollars.
2018 — 3.2
2019 — 3.4
2020 — 2.6
2021 — 4.0
2022 — 1.5 (–63.9%)
2023 — 1.1 (–24.0%)
This code encompasses vehicles and their components, and despite the severe negative impact of the war on their supplies, they still exceed a billion dollars, constituting a substantial portion of Korean exports to the Russian Federation.
Product code 84
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof, billion dollars.
2018 — 1.00
2019 — 0.98
2020 — 1.00
2021 — 1.47
2022 — 1.16 (–21.1%)
2023 — 1.33 (+14.3%)
The supply of this category of goods has not been significantly affected by the war so far, but indications suggest changes may be imminent. The latest South Korean sanctions against Russia, announced in December, impose restrictions on the supply of heavy construction equipment, metal-cutting machines, and some other items. However, a specific list of newly sanctioned goods has not yet been announced, unless I missed something.
Product code 8429
Bulldozers, graders, levelers, scrapers, angle dozers, mechanical shovels, excavators, shovel loaders, tamping machines and road rollers, self-propelled, million dollars.
2018 — 172.8
2019 — 175.8
2020 — 149.8
2021 — 336.9
2022 — 304.0 (–9.8%)
2023 — 319.5 (+5.1%)
Out of the $319.5 million exports in 2023: single-bucket front loaders (code 842951) — $23 million; machines with a 360 degree revolving superstructure (code 842952) — $297 million.
Machines with a 360 degree revolving superstructure are presumably excavators, and their exports seemed likely to be controlled this year, but so far, judging by the statistics, the war has not affected it in any way.
Product code 8409
Spare parts for internal combustion engines, million dollars.
2018 — 15.8
2019 — 14.1
2020 — 17.4
2021 — 113.6
2022 — 46.2 (–59.3%)
2023 — 6.0 (–86.9%)
Regarding this code, the Russians actively made purchases in Korea in the second half of 2021 and at the beginning of 2022, apparently intensively preparing for war. But by the spring of 2022, this opportunity was largely closed for Russians.
Product code 8486
Machines and apparatus of a kind used solely or principally for the manufacture of semiconductor boules or wafers, semiconductor devices, electronic integrated circuits or flat panel displays, millions of dollars.
2018 — 15.1
2019 — 14.7
2020 — 3.5
2021 — 3.1
2022 — 41.7 (+1260.5%)
2023 — 2.5 (–94.0%)
Regarding this position, record deliveries in the entire history of bilateral relations amounting to more than 35 million dollars occurred in October 2022, during the war. After this, the volumes became small again. Either the Russians have bought enough and don’t need more, or the sanctions have finally started working. A number of products under code 8486 are included in the US Bureau of Industry and Security list mentioned above, indicating they have dual use and must be strictly controlled.
Product code 7308
Structures of iron or steel and parts thereof; plates, rods, angles, shapes, sections, tubes and the like, prepared for use in structures, million dollars.
2018 — 24.5
2019 — 39.8
2020 — 21.2
2021 — 486.9
2022 — 601.9 (+23.6%)
2023 — 586.2 (–2.6%)
Over the past three years, Russia has unexpectedly become the world leader in the import of Korean metal structures, purchasing them here in the amount of about half a billion dollars a year. Pay attention to the sharp — tenfold — increase in indicators for this position. The Korean government, apparently, was also surprised and decided, just in case, to include metal structures among the goods subject to export control. Let’s see how this affects the 2024 indicators.
Product code 33
Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations, million dollars.
2018 — 161.2
2019 — 213.9
2020 — 245.0
2021 — 290.1
2022 — 287.4 (—0.9%)
2023 — 404.1 (+40.6%)
While some are at war, others are experiencing a cosmetic boom! Never before has Russia purchased as many cosmetics from Korea as in 2023. 404 million dollars is a very respectable amount. And growth of more than 40 percent compared to 2022 is impressive. Cosmetics, of course, were not subject to either sanctions or Russian counter-sanctions.
Product code 21
Miscellaneous edible preparations (instant coffee, sauces, ice cream, etc.), million dollars.
2018 — 82.2
2019 — 75.5
2020 — 67.4
2021 — 91.4
2022 — 94.8 (+3.7%)
2023 — 104.0 (+9.8%)
Food products are also not under sanctions, and this is having an effect: there is a constant increase in exports. Plus, the Korean food industry is clearly on the rise right now. Almost like K-pop. Jokes aside.
Product code 90
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories, million dollars.
2018 — 202.9
2019 — 233.2
2020 — 257.4
2021 — 300.6
2022 — 326.6 (+8.7%)
2023 — 381.6 (+16.8%)
Despite the ongoing war, there has been a continuous increase in exports in this category. It’s worth noting that some equipment under this code is listed by the US Bureau of Industry and Security as dual-use products. In particular, Russia purchased goods under code 902750 from Korea in 2022 and 2023 for about $4.7 million.
Product code 8507
Electric accumulators, including separators therefore; whether or not rectangular (including square), million dollars.
2018 — 58.5
2019 — 48.5
2020 — 43.2
2021 — 59.7
2022 — 58.8 (–1.5%)
2023 — 79.3 (+34.8%)
I present this position as another example of how trade may be affected by future sanctions, given that batteries are included in the new Korean sanctions lists. Despite this, there was growth in their supplies last year, albeit unstable. Let’s see if the sanctions have an impact.
Product code 39
Plastics and articles thereof, million dollars.
2018 — 501.4
2019 — 506.6
2020 — 439.7
2021 — 720.1
2022 — 634.1 (–11.9%)
2023 — 501.5 (–20.9%)
Plastics are among the leaders among Korean goods in terms of export volume to Russia. Despite some fluctuations, their supplies still remain at a fairly high level, typical for the late 2010s, or even exceed it. Below are two specific examples.
Product code 3901
Polymers of ethylene, in primary forms, million dollars.
2018 — 98.9
2019 — 113.4
2020 — 70.7
2021 — 151.5
2022 — 196.9 (+30.0%)
2023 — 117.4 (–40.4%)
Product code 3920
Plastics; plates, sheets, film, foil and strip (not self-adhesive); non-cellular and not reinforced, laminated, supported or similarly combined with other materials, million dollars.
2018 — 71.5
2019 — 75.7
2020 — 78.0
2021 — 96.5
2022 — 95.6 (–1.0%)
2023 — 103.5 (+8.3%)
Product code 2710
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes, million dollars.
2018 — 91
2019 — 97
2020 — 100
2021 — 140
2022 — 233 (+66.2%)
2023 — 303 (+30.4%)
Despite lacking its own oil, Korea has become a major supplier of processed petroleum products to the world market through its constructed plants. Now, Korean petroleum products are sent to Russia in significant quantities, reaching record figures for bilateral trade in the past two years.
Product code 29
Organic chemicals, million dollars.
2018 — 172.0
2019 — 136.3
2020 — 59.9
2021 — 95.0
2022 — 74.6 (–21.5%)
2023 — 91.5 (+22.7%)
The chemical industry is a thriving export sector for Korea. If we broaden our view beyond organics and consider the entire spectrum of chemical products exported from Korea to Russia, the total would be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
Product code 34
Soap, powder and other surface-active agents, lubricants, etc.
2018 — 23.7
2019 — 22.4
2020 — 22.6
2021 — 32.9
2022 — 39.1 (+19.0%)
2023 — 44.5 (+13.8%)
Beyond soap and washing powder, there’s a notable surge in lubricant exports (commodity code 3403) to Russia, soaring from $783 thousand in 2021 to $2.95 million in 2023. Although seemingly small in volume, the sudden demand for lubricants raises questions about their specific use in Russia.
Product code 7210
Iron or non-alloy steel; flat-rolled products, width 600mm or more, clad, plated or coated, million dollars.
2018 — 112.8
2019 — 140.9
2020 — 135.1
2021 — 186.4
2022 — 56.1 (–69.9%)
2023 — 36.6 (–34.7%)
Interestingly, in 2023, exports of this type of flat-rolled product to Latvia surged to $7.4 million from $328 thousand in the previous year, marking a remarkable 2161% increase. However, this could also be a mere coincidence. Jokes aside.
Product code 5902
Textile fabrics; tyrecord of high tenacity yarn of nylon or other polyamides polyesters or viscose rayon, million dollars.
2018 — 9.3
2019 — 9.5
2020 — 6.8
2021 — 10.1
2022 — 1.9 (–81.2%)
2023 — 0.008 (–99.6%)
This and the following table illustrate situations where sanctions are effective.
Product code 8803
Parts for airplanes and helicopters, million dollars.
2018 — 12.8
2019 — 6.7
2020 — 8.3
2021 — 14.9
2022 — 0 (–100%)
2023 — 0
Product code 4011
New pneumatic tyres, of rubber, million dollars.
2018 — 136.3
2019 — 142.9
2020 — 95.9
2021 — 109.4
2022 — 82.1 (–25.0%)
2023 — 105.0 (+27.9%)
In this case, even though it appears to be a dual-use product, there seem to be no sanctions in place.
Product code 281122
Silicon dioxide, million dollars.
2018 — 0.2
2019 — 0.1
2020 — 0.1
2021 — 0.1
2022 — 7.9 (+6102.9%)
2023 — 12.0 (+51.4%)
During the war, Russians inexplicably increased their purchases of silicon dioxide from Korea. The purpose behind this sudden surge and whether it warrants investigation remain unanswered questions.
Product code 381129
Lubricating oil additives, million dollars.
2018 — 0.02
2019 — 0.4
2020 — 0.9
2021 — 1.2
2022 — 8.6 (+620.1%)
2023 — 12.5 (+46.0%)
Another surge in purchases raises questions. The reasons behind this sudden demand for lube oil additives are unclear and may warrant further investigation.
Product code 82
Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof, of base metal (Three main types: 820720, dies for drawing or extruding metal; 820730, tools for pressing, stamping, or punching; 820900, plates, sticks, tips and the like for tools, unmounted, of sintered metal carbides or cermets.) In millions of dollars.
2018 — 42.3
2019 — 37.1
2020 — 74.4
2021 — 45.2
2022 — 45.9 (+1.6%)
2023 — 101.7 (+121.6%)
Never before have the Russians purchased such a significant quantity of industrial tools from Korea, specifically the ones listed above, as in the second year of the war with Ukraine. This noteworthy increase prompts contemplation.
Product code 251512
Marble and travertine; merely cut, by sawing or otherwise, into blocks or slabs of a rectangular (including square) shape, having a specific gravity of 2.5 or more.
2018 — 0
2019 — 0
2020 — 0
2021 — 0
2022 — 0
2023 — $5.9 million (252 tons)
If this is indeed what it seems, it evokes the spirit of «the shortest complete short story ever» often falsely attributed to Hemingway: «For sale: baby shoes, never worn.»
Import from Russia to South Korea
Product code 2709
Crude oil and crude oil products derived from bituminous minerals, billion dollars.
2018 — 5.9
2019 — 4.6
2020 — 2.4
2021 — 4.3
2022 — 2.3 (–45.8%)
2023 — 0 (–100%)
Product code 2710
Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not crude, billion dollars.
2018 — 3.9
2019 — 3.2
2020 — 2.7
2021 — 4.7
2022 — 1.7 (–64.5%)
2023 — 0.005 (–99.7%)
This vividly illustrates the effectiveness of sanctions against the Russian oil sector. South Korea has completely ceased importing Russian crude oil and petroleum products, marking a stark departure from the recent past where oil comprised the majority of imports from the Russian Federation. In the short term, this led to a spike in global oil prices, adversely affecting Korea, while benefiting Russia. However, in the long run, the sanctions appear to be achieving their intended effect by depriving Putin of significant oil markets and the enormous profits from energy exports.
Product code 2711
Petroleum gas and other gaseous hydrocarbons (including natural gas), billions of dollars.
2018 — 1.0
2019 — 1.1
2020 — 0.8
2021 — 1.7
2022 — 1.5 (–13.7%)
2023 — 1.1 (–28.5%)
Oil, however, is not the sole source of energy. Additionally, there is still natural gas, and, as evident, Korea continues to import it from Russia at pre-war levels.
Product code 2701
Coal, billion dollars.
2018 — 3.5
2019 — 2.8
2020 — 2.0
2021 — 2.6
2022 — 5.7 (+121.9%)
2023 — 4.4 (–22.3%)
A fascinating tale unfolds concerning coal, a seemingly forgotten but classic energy source that remains very much relevant. In South Korea, coal-fired thermal power plants persist, contributing to air pollution and global warming. The substantial increase in coal purchases from Russia during wartime has allowed the Russians to offset, to some extent, the losses from the cessation of oil trade. In terms of value, coal now represents almost half of all Russian exports to Korea.
What else does Russia supply to Korea besides coal and gas?
Product code 03
Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates, billion dollars.
2018 — 0.91
2019 — 0.92
2020 — 0.92
2021 — 1.22
2022 — 1.42 (+11.4%)
2023 — 1.09 (–42.4%)
Including (2023): crabs — $366 million; fresh frozen pollock — $138 million; liver, caviar, and milt — $133 million.
Product code 76
Aluminum and articles thereof, million dollars.
2018 — 343.9
2019 — 299.3
2020 — 215.6
2021 — 325.2
2022 — 436.7 (+34.3%)
2023 — 700.8 (+60.5%)
The current level of purchases of Russian aluminum by Korea is still far from the record level — previously it used to exceed $800 and even $900 million. But still, it is twice or even three times higher than before the war. It is also interesting to note that Europeans, for example, are now trying to get rid of Russian aluminum and limit its imports. In such a situation, Korea, it turns out, comes to Russia’s aid, redirecting supplies to itself. Putin’s so-called «Turn to the East» is in action!
Also of note: almost the entire volume of imports for this item in 2023 was unprocessed aluminum (code 7601) — $679.2 million.
Product code 72
Iron and steel, million dollars.
2018 — 505.4
2019 — 431.5
2020 — 308.8
2021 — 690.5
2022 — 500.2 (–27.6%)
2023 — 413.2 (–17.4%)
Including (2023): ferroalloys — 163.0 million dollars, waste and scrap of ferrous metals — 138.5, cast iron — 110 million dollars.
Product code 44
Wood and articles of wood, million dollars.
2018 — 168.0
2019 — 143.7
2020 — 145.7
2021 — 242.0
2022 — 257.1 (+6.2%)
2023 — 252.0 (–2.0%)
Including (2023): fuel wood (code 4401) — $113 million, sawn timber (4407) — $92 million.
Product code 284420
Uranium; enriched in uranium-235, million dollars.
2018 — 197.0
2019 — 168.7
2020 — 166.1
2021 — 165.4
2022 — 137.0 (–17.1%)
2023 — 243.4 (+77.6%)
Low enrichment uranium is used as fuel in nuclear power plants. The Russian Federation is the world leader in uranium enrichment. There are few other manufacturers in the world.
Product code 26
Ores, million dollars.
2018 — 103.8
2019 — 54.9
2020 — 38.4
2021 — 55.1
2022 — 86.4 (+56.9%)
2023 — 125.0 (+44.6%)
Including (2023): lead ores and concentrates — $59.5 million, precious metal ores and concentrates — $32.5 million, zinc ores and concentrates — $20.5. The 2023 figure is high for bilateral trade, but not a record; 2013 and 2014 were higher.
To summarize: the items listed here account for about $8.3 billion of the $8.9 billion total Russian imports into Korea. Apart from enriched uranium, which, like the infamous novichok, cannot be produced in the kitchen, all these are banal raw materials. That is, no matter how much Russia has boasted all these decades that it supposedly has some mysterious “high technologies” that are about to replace raw materials in its exports, it still doesn’t work out in practice. Unbelievable but true.
